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MooRE v. TEXAS: THE CONTINUED QUEST FOR A
NATIONAL STANDARD
ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court has long held that certain types of sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Throughout the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, it has
reiterated that excessive-punishment claims are informed by evolving
standards of decency. When the Court assesses a form of punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it utilizes a two-part proportionality review.
This test requires the Court to first assess whether a national consensus has
formed against a particular type of punishment through an examination of
state legislation. If a national consensus exists, then the Court subjectively
contemplates whether it has reason to disagree with the legislative trend.
Consequently, a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if
the Court agrees with the national consensus.
In 2002, for the first time, the Supreme Court held that using capital
punishment on intellectually disabled offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In its decision, the Court
provided little guidance and left to the states the autonomy to develop
standards for assessing intellectual disability in such cases. However, this
task proved problematic, demonstrated by the Court granting certiorari
twice in the past fifteen years to determine whether state standards adhere
to its 2002 holding.
In Moore v. Texas, the Supreme Court struck down Texas's procedural standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. Specifically, it held that Texas's use of seven evidentiary questions based
upon lay perceptions was unconstitutional because a national consensus
had formed against utilizing this type of subjective indicia to determine
intellectual disability. This Case Comment analyzes the Court's reasoning
behind its invalidation of Texas's standards, as well as the differences in
state procedures for determining intellectual disability. These variations in
state standards indicate that intellectually disabled offenders may be subject to the death penalty in some states but not in others depending on
where they are tried and sentenced. Finally, through the lens of the incorporation and equal protection doctrines, this Comment argues that the
Court should cease its search for national consensus when contemplating
the constitutionality of different state procedures and instead provide a
uniform test for determining intellectual disability in capital cases.

781

782

DENVER LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 95:3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.
....................................
............
I. BACKGROUND
..............................................
II. MOORE V. TEXAS ..................................................

782
783
788

A. Facts.............................
................. 788
B. ProceduralHistory.
..............................
.....789
C. Opinion of the Court
.....................................
790
D. Dissenting Opinion
.......................................
791
III. ANALYSIS
............................................
..... 792
A. ConstitutionalConsiderationsfor a Uniform Standard
ofIntellectualDisability in CapitalCases
................. 793
1. Incorporation Considerations
.................
..... 793
2. Equal Protection Considerations ............
.........
795
B. The Difficulty ofFinding a National Consensus in the
Proceduresfor Determining Intellectually Disablity ................. 798
1. The Substantive Ban Against Executing Intellectually Disabled
Offenders .
...................................
798
2. The Court Should Cease Searching for a National Consensus
. to Determine the Adequacy of State Procedures................... 799
C. Creatinga Uniform Standard
...................
....... 805
1. The Parallels to Roper v. Simmons
............
........ 805
2. Utilizing Widely Accepted Clinical Standards .....
..... 806
CONCLUSION

...........................................

......

808

INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on its people.' The Supreme Court of the United States began to place categorical
bans on certain types of punishment in the early twentieth century.2 These
prohibitions covered a wide array of sentences, such as the denaturalization of natural-born citizens and the use of capital punishment for underage offenders. 3 And while the types of punishments the Court has assessed
vary greatly, the underlying rationale of its analysis has remained steadfast: ensuring the government affords every individual the dignity that the
1.
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and PrisonerInterests in Determining What Is
Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1815 (2012).
2.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-13 (2002) (providing a broad overview of the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretationof the EighthAmendment-Rummel, Solem, and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L.J. 789,
798-99 (1984) (explaining that the Court first provided an in-depth discussion of the Eighth Amendment in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-80 (1910)).
3.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) (discussing the prohibition of
capital punishment for underage offenders); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92-93 (1958) (plurality opinion) (explaining that denaturalization of natural-born citizens is not an appropriate punishment).
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human race deserves.4 As Justice Stewart opined in Robinson v. California,5 "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the 'crime' of having a common cold." 6
In the 1980s, the Court first addressed whether the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled offenders. While the Atkins v. Virginia
Court determined that this class of individuals are inherently less culpable
than those of average intelligence and therefore protected by the Eighth
Amendment, the Court provided each state with the autonomy to create its
own standards for enforcement.9 However, the Court has had to address
various states' chosen methodologies to ensure that they are not executing
the class of individuals the Court intended to protect.10 In Moore v.
Texas," the Court held that the Texas courts utilized an unconstitutional
test for determining intellectual disability in capital cases, effectively narrowing a state's independence in creating its own Atkins standard.1 2 This
Case Comment first provides an overview of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the use of capital punishment for intellectually disabled offenders. Next, it provides a synopsis of
the Court's opinion in Moore. Finally, this Comment proposes that the
Court should cease its search for a national consensus on the procedural
standards of an Atkins claim and instead implement a national standard for
assessing intellectual disability in death penalty cases.
I. BACKGROUND

Over the past century, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive punishment has
evolved to reflect societal "standards of decency."' 3 The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 4 However,
as Justice Stevens noted in Atkins, the Court does not review claims of
excessive punishment "by the standards that prevailed in 1685 .. . or when
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Id. at 667.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989), abrogatedby Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
536 U.S. 304.

9.

See id at 317, 321; Natalie A. Pifer, The Scientific and the Social in Implementing Atkins

v. Virginia, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 1036, 1039 (2016).
10. See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986,
1993 (2014); see also Pifer, supra note 9, at 1036-37.
11.
137 S. Ct. 1039.
12. See id. at 1052-53.
13. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
14.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Justin F. Marceau, Un-incorporatingthe Bill of Rights: The
Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federalism Concerns that Underlie Modern
CriminalProcedureReforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1287-88 (2008) (explaining that
the Court first incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states in Robinson v. California, 370

U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962)).
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the Bill of Rights was adopted."' 5 Instead, it judges Eighth Amendment
claims through the lens of current societal standards of moral decency.' 6

'

In the early 1900s, the Court declared "that it is a precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense." 7 Utilizing a proportionality review in Weems v. United States,
the Court held that being jailed in irons and forced to perform hard labor
was an excessive punishment for falsifying records.' 9 In Weems, the Court
explained that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment continuously
evolves "as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 20
The Court has continued to "appl[y] this proportionality precept" in its
subsequent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 2
In Trop v. Dulles,22 Chief Justice Warren explained that the "basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity
of man" and that it "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 23 After Trop, the
Court fully articulated its two-part proportionality test for excessive-punishment claims.24 First, it looks to state legislation to assess whether a consensus has formed in terms of societal values.25 The Court found that the
use of legislative judgment is necessary because "in 'a democratic society
legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people."' 2 6 If the Court determines that a
societal consensus exists, it then subjectively contemplates "whether there
is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its
legislators." 27

15.
16.
17.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
Id. at 311-12.
Id. at 311 (alteration in original) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367

(1910)); see Susan Raeker-Jordan, Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: "Still in Search of

a Unifying Principle"?, 73 U. PITT. L. REv. 107, 119-20 (2011) (detailing the Court's reasoning in
Weems).

18.
19.

217 U.S. 349.
Id. at 357, 366, 382; see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 17, at 118-19; Bruce J. Winick, The

Supreme Court's Evolving Death PenaltyJurisprudence:Severe Mental Illness as the next Frontier,

50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 796 (2009).
20.

Weems, 217 U.S. at 378; see Winick, supra note 19.

21.
22.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
356 U.S. 86 (1958).

23.
ing Both
(quoting
24.

Id. at 100-01; Judith M. Barger, Avoiding Atkins v. Virginia: How States Are Circumventthe Letter and the Spirit of the Court's Mandate, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 215, 219 (2008)
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01); see Raeker-Jordan, supra note 17, at 122.
Barger, supra note 23; see Lyn Entzeroth, ConstitutionalProhibitionon the Execution of

the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant, 38 TULSA L. REV. 299, 303-04 (2002) (detailing the
Court's application of the two-part proportionality test to the facts of Trop).

25.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
26.
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1056-57 (2017) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
175 (1976)).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
27.
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In Furman v. Georgia,28 the Court further narrowed the use of capital
punishment. 29 The Court invalidated "the then-existing death penalty statutes in effect around the country" because it found that these statutes violated the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. 30 In
deciding the case, the Court took issue with Texas's discretionary capital
sentencing system, which provided jurors with "unrestricted discretion to
choose between a death sentence and alternative periods of confinement
for convicted capital offenders." 3 1This forced the Texas legislature to reassess its capital punishment statute, and in 1973, it enacted new provisions to help guide jurors in capital cases.32 These new procedures mandated separate sentencing hearings where state courts provide the jury with
specific questions to help focus its decision.33
Just three years later in Jurek v. Texas, 34 the Court upheld Texas's
post-Furmancapital sentencing procedure.35 It explained that states must
allow jurors to perform a particularized assessment of both the crime committed and the individual defendant. 36 Furthermore, the Court noted that
"a capital [punishment] sentencing system must allow the sentencer to
consider [both] mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances" to ensure
appropriately individualized sentencing.37 Because the Texas court allowed juries to consider a wide array of factors when assessing a defendant's potential for future violence, the Court held that the state's capital
sentencing procedures were constitutional.38
In 1986, the Court first declared a categorical ban against executing
certain individuals based on "class-wide characteristics." 39 In Ford v.
Wainwright,40 Justice Marshall examined the history of capital punishment
for "insane" offenders, noting that "[t]oday, no State in the Union permits
the execution of the insane." 4 1 He further observed that the Court "seriously question[s] the retributive value of executing a person who has no

28.
29.

408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Id. at 239-40; see Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas CapitalOffenders'

Post-Atkins Claims of Mental Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 6-7 (2011).
30.
Entzeroth, supra note 24, at 304; see Tobolowsky, supranote 29.
31.
Tobolowsky, supra note 29.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 7.
Id.
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Id. at 276; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 9-10.

36.

Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 9.

37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.

39.

Jonathan Greenberg, For Every Action There Is a Reaction: The ProceduralPushback

Against Panetti v. Quarterman, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 227, 229, 229 n.16 (2012) (providing an overview of the Court's subsequent bans based on class-wide characteristics); see Ford v. Wainwright, 477

U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
40. 477 U.S. 399.
41. Id. at 408-09.
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comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life." 42 Thus, the Court held that executing a mentally insane individual violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment.4 3
Three years after declaring that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of insane offenders, the Court addressed the issue of executing
intellectually disabled criminals for the first time.4 In Penry v. Lynaugh,4
a jury found the defendant guilty of capital murder and sentenced him to
death.4 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether
the jury had the opportunity to adequately consider the defendant's intellectual capabilities and (2) whether executing an intellectually disabled offender violated the Eighth Amendment. 4 7 The Court overturned the defendant's death sentence because the jury instructions did not clearly convey that the jury could consider the defendant's intellectual disability as a
mitigating factor. 48 However, the Court ultimately declined to extend an
Eighth Amendment's categorical ban on capital punishment of those offenders with "mild" or "moderate" intellectual disability. 49
Before the Court first addressed the appropriateness of capital punishment for intellectually disabled offenders in Penry, Georgia's execution
of Jerome Bowden garnered a great deal of public outcry.5 A jury sentenced Bowden to death after he murdered a woman during a robbery.
The state scheduled his execution for June 18, 1986, but a Georgia court
52
granted a stay to assess his mental competency. After Bowden underwent
testing, a state-hired psychologist concluded that Bowden's intelligence
quotient (IQ) was 65.5 And while the state psychologist's findings clearly
showed that Bowden suffered from intellectual disability, the Georgia
Board of Pardon and Paroles nevertheless lifted the stay the very same day

42.

Id at 409.

43.
44.

Id at 409-10; see Greenberg, supranote 39, at 229.
See Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 3, 13.

45.

492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogatedby Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

46.
Id. at 310; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 11; see Mark Alan Ozimek, The Casefor a More
Workable Standardin Death Penalty Jurisprudence. Atkins v. Virginia and CategoricalExemptions
Under the Imprudent "Evolving Standardsof Decency" Doctrine, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 665-66

(2003).
47.

Penry, 492 U.S. at 310; Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 11-13; see Ozimek, supra note 46,

at 666.
48.
Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 12; see Timothy S. Hall, Legal Fictionsand Moral Reasoning: CapitalPunishment and the Mentally RetardedDefendantAfter Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L.

REV. 327, 347-48 (2002).
49.
50.

Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 14; see Pifer, supranote 9, at 1038.
Timothy R. Saviello, The AppropriateStandardof Prooffor DeterminingIntellectual Dis-

ability in Capital Cases:How High Is Too High?, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 163, 168-69 (2015); see,
e.g., Associated Press, RetardedMan, 33, Electrocutedas Plea to High CourtIs Rejected, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1986, at Al 6; United Press International, Killer Executed in Georgia;He Had an IQ of 65,
L.A. TIMES (June 24, 1986), http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-24/news/mn-211961_iq-test.

51.
52.
53.

Saviello, supra note 50, at 165-66.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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the psychologist performed the test.54 The state executed Bowden less than
twenty-four hours later.55 In 1988, Georgia became the first state to ban
the use of capital punishment against intellectually disabled offenders, in
56
part because of the extreme public reaction against Bowden's execution.
Seventeen states followed in Georgia's footsteps over the span of less than
fourteen years, illustrating that a national consensus had formed against
the practice.
A mere thirteen years after Penry, the Supreme Court revisited the
issue of executing intellectually disabled individuals in Atkins.58 In Atkins,
a Virginia state court convicted the defendant of abduction, robbery, and
capital murder. 59 He was subsequently sentenced to death, despite the evidence establishing that he had an IQ of 59.60 In reversing the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision, the Court effectively abrogated its decision in
Penry.61 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens first assessed the
trend in state legislation and found that eighteen states had enacted statutes
banning the execution of intellectually disabled individuals within fourteen years.62 However, Justice Stevens noted that the number of states was
not as important as "the consistency of the direction of [the] change." 63 In
weighing the proportionality of the defendant's sentence, the Court found
that executing intellectually disabled offenders does not further the penological aims of capital punishment. 64 Because this class of individuals possess "diminished capacities to understand and process information,". the
Court reasoned that these offenders are less morally culpable than those
with average intelligence.65 Additionally, the Court reasoned that intellectually disabled offenders have a higher risk of wrongful execution because
of the "possibility of false confessions" and a "lesser ability ... to make a
,,66
persuasive showing of mitigation.

54.
Id; see also Brooke Amos, Atkins v. Virginia: Analyzing the CorrectStandardand ExaminationPracticesto Use when DeterminingMental Retardation, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 469, 470
(explaining that the psychologist who administered Bowden's IQ test determined that Bowden "was
not mentally retarded enough to deserve clemency" because he had scored six points higher than his
originally measured IQ).

55.
56.
57.

Saviello, supranote 50, at 165.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.

58.

Hensleigh Crowell, The Writing Is on the Wall: How the Briseno FactorsCreate an Unac-

ceptable Risk ofExecuting Persons with Intellectual Disability, 94 TEX. L. REV. 743, 743-44 (2016).
59.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307 (2002); see Ozimek, supranote 46, at 668-70 (providing an in-depth discussion of the facts of Atkins).

60.
61.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309; see Ozimek, supra note 46, at 670.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.

Id. at 314-15; see Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challenge ofImplement62.
ing Atkins v. Virginia: How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudicationsof Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 811, 812 (2007).
63.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; see Crowell, supra note 58, at 745.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (noting that the penological goals of the death penalty include ret64.
ribution and deterrence for potential offenders).

65.
66.

Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 320.
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While the Court's decision in Atkins established a categorical ban, it
left "to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction." 67 This task proved problematic, and the Court
was faced with addressing Florida's standards for intellectual disability
68
twelve years after it decided Atkins. In Hall v. Florida,
the defendant was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 69 Although the
defendant presented evidence of adaptive deficits and had an IQ of 71, the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the defendant's sentence.70
Florida's statutory definition of intellectual disability in capital cases
set a bright-line IQ cutoff of 70, which means that no defendant with an
IQ below 70 was eligible for the death penalty.7 ' Justice Kennedy rejected
Florida's standard, explaining that it did not adequately account for the
"inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself." 7 2 The Court held that states
must account for the clinically accepted standard error of measurement
(SEM) when considering an offender's IQ. 73 Although the Court reiterated
that states may implement their own definitions of intellectual disability,
it concluded that those definitions must be "informed by the views of medical experts." 74 A mere three years later in Moore, the Court attempted to
provide states with further guidance in crafting their own definitions of
intellectual disability.
II. MOORE V. TEXAS

A. Facts
On April 25, 1980, Bobby James Moore and two friends decided to
rob a supermarket. The group, carrying two of Moore's firearms, entered
the Birdsall Super Market in Houston, Texas. 76 They immediately proceeded to the courtesy booth where two clerks, James McCarble and Edna
Scott, were stationed.77 The men approached the clerks and Moore shot
McCarble in the head, killing him instantly.7 8 Moore fled the scene and
police arrested him ten days later in Louisiana. 7 9 After Moore provided

67.
Id. at 317 (alteration in original) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986)).
68.
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
69.
Id at 1990; Ashley Sachiko Wong, Aligning the CriminalJustice System with the Mental
Health Profession in Response to Hall v. Florida, 94 OR. L. REv. 425, 430-31 (2016).
70.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992; see Crowell, supra note 58, at 757.
71.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
72.
Id. at 1995.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 1998-2000; Crowell, supra note 58, at 757 (explaining that the Court held in Hall that
"state policies that deviate from clinical definitions of intellectually disability create an unacceptable
risk of executing intellectually disabled individuals and are therefore unconstitutional").

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1054 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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police with a written statement admitting his involvement in the crime, the
State charged Moore with capital murder.8 0
B. ProceduralHistory
A jury convicted Moore of capital murder and sentenced him to death
a mere two months after his arrest.8' A federal habeas court vacated the
sentence due to ineffective trial counsel and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.82
In 2001, a second jury sentenced Moore to death, and the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed the jury's decision.83 Moore then challenged the sentence, seeking state habeas relief and claiming that his intellectual disability precluded him from capital punishment. 84
In 2014, the Texas habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether Moore qualified as intellectually disabled.85 Moore
presented evidence indicating that he "had significant mental and social
difficulties beginning at an early age." 8 6 The state habeas court ultimately
determined that Moore possessed "subaverage intellectual functioning"
based on the results of six IQ tests, the average of which produced a score
87
of 70.66. In addition, it concluded that Moore possessed serious adaptive
deficits based on the testimony of several mental health professionals.88
Using current clinical diagnostic standards, the habeas court determined
that Moore qualified as intellectually disabled and therefore his sentence
"violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription of 'cruel and unusual punishments."' 8 9 The habeas court recommended that the CCA either change
Moore's sentence to life in prison or allow for a new trial due to his intellectual disability. 90
The CCA declined to adopt the recommendation of the state habeas
court and again affirmed Moore's sentence after utilizing the clinical
standards set forth in the 1992 edition of the American Association on
Mental Retardation (AAMR) and the factors in Ex parte Briseno.9 ' The
CCA created the Briseno factors, 92 which includes seven questions to assess intellectual disability based on lay perceptions, to counteract what it

8 0. Id.
81. Id. at 1044 (majority opinion).
82.
Id. at 1044-45.
83.
Id. at 1045; see also Court of Criminal Appeals, TEX. JUD. BRANCH,
http://www.txcourts.gov/cca (last visited May 16, 2018) (stating that the CCA is the highest court in
Texas for criminal cases).
84. Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1045.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 1046.
89. Id. at 1044 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII).
90.
Id at 1046.
91.
Id. at 1044, 1046; Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), abrogatedby
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1039.
92.

The Briseno factors include the following seven evidentiary questions:
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deemed to be the "exceedingly subjective" nature of the adaptive deficit
prong of clinical guidelines. 9 3 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to determine whether the CCA's methods for determining intellectual disability in capital cases adhered to the Eighth Amendment and the Court's precedents. 94
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court. 95 Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined her. 9 6 The Court vacated the
CCA's ruling, holding that the Briseno factors violate the Eighth Amendment and deviate from the Court's holding in both Atkins and Hall.9 7 JUStice Ginsburg began by reviewing the Court's previous Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, emphasizing that the purpose of the Eighth Amendment "reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons." 98 She further explained that, per Atkins, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from taking the life of intellectually disabled offenders because the practice fails to further the penological aims of capital punishment.9 9 Finally, the majority opinion noted that while "being informed by
the medical community does not demand adherence" to the latest clinical
diagnostic framework, the Court's precedent does not allow states to
simply "disregard . . . current medical standards." 10 0
Justice Ginsburg then examined the CCA's procedures for determining intellectual disability in capital cases. 1 First, she rejected the CCA's
conclusion that two of Moore's IQ scores (74 and 78) proved that he is not
intellectually disabled.1 0 2 Justice Ginsburg detailed the Court's holding in
Hall, which requires states to account for the SEM when assessing an IQ
"close to, but above, 70."103 She determined that the CCA failed to
(1) Did those who knew the person best during the developmental stage-his family,
friends, teachers, employers, authorities-think he was mentally retarded at the time, and,
if so, act in accordance with that determination?; (2) Has the person formulated plans and
carried them through or is his conduct impulsive?; (3) Does his conduct show leadership
or does it show that he is led around by others?; (4) Is his conduct in response to external
stimuli rational and appropriate, regardless of whether it is socially acceptable?; (5) Does
he respond coherently, rationally, and on point to oral or written questions or do his responses wander from subject to subject?; (6) Can the person hide facts or lie effectively in
his own or others' interests?; and (7) Putting aside any heinousness or gruesomeness surrounding the capital offense, did the commission of that offense require forethought, planning, and complex execution of purpose?

Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8-9.
93.
Id at 8.
94.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1048.
95.
Id. at 1043.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1053.
98. Id. at 1048 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)).
99. Id.
100.
Id. at 1049.
101.

Id.

102.
103.

Id. at 1047, 1049.
Id. at 1049.
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properly consider Moore's intellectual functioning because, after the required SEM adjustment, his IQ of 74 produced a range of 69 to 79.104 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg dismissed the State's assertion that it may disregard part of Moore's IQ range because of his personal circumstances. 05
Ultimately, the Court held that a state may not cease its inquiry into an
offender's intellectual disability merely because the offender's IQ score
falls slightly above 70.106
The Court then considered whether the CCA utilized appropriate
methods to determine Moore's adaptive deficits. 0 7 Justice Ginsburg noted
that the CCA's assessment of Moore's adaptive functioning "deviated
from prevailing clinical standards and from the older clinical standards the
court claimed to apply." 0 8 For example, the CCA placed considerable emphasis on Moore's perceived adaptive strengths, such as playing pool for
money.1 09 However, clinical standards focus on adaptive deficits, not
strengths, to determine an individual's overall adaptive functioning." 0 Accordingly, the Court held that the CCA's deviation from the current medical standards violated the protections afforded to intellectually disabled

individuals.'
Finally, the Court examined the CCA's use of the Briseno evidentiary
factors in assessing Moore's intellectual status.112 Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Briseno factors merely perpetuate the lay stereotypes of
intellectual disability that the medical community seeks to combat." 3 Additionally, the Court noted that no state legislatures had adopted anything
remotely similar to the Briseno factors to determine an individual's intellectual ability.1 4 The Court ultimately held that "[m]ild levels of intellectual disability, although they may fall outside Texas citizens' consensus,
nevertheless remain intellectual disabilities.""s
D. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
delivered a dissenting opinion."1 6 Although the Chief Justice agreed that
the Briseno evidentiary factors are inappropriate, he argued that the CCA's
overall determination of Moore's intellectual disability did not violate the
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id
Id. at 1053.
Id.at1051-52.
Id. at 1052.

114.
Id. (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals had adopted the use of the Briseno factors, but neither state legislature had codified the factors).

115.
116.

Id. at l051.
Id. at 1053 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

792

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:3

Eighth Amendment or the Court's precedent.'1 7 Chief Justice Roberts began by expressing his concern with the majority opinion's emphasis on the
use of prevailing clinical standards."'8 Reiterating the Court's holding in
Atkins, the Chief Justice argued that Texas courts appropriately considered
medical standards when creating the state's definition of intellectual disability. 119 Furthermore, he asserted that it was within the CCA's discretion
to dismiss the lower end of Moore's IQ range due to mitigating factors.120
Because Moore's IQ did not fall below 70 after the CCA rejected his lower
range of scores, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the state court could not
find Moore intellectually disabled because he failed "one part of the
CCA's three-part test." 2 1
Next, the dissent objected to the majority opinion's departure from
its Eighth Amendment precedent, which Chief Justice Roberts described
as a prohibition of "sentences that our society deems repugnant.",22 He
argued that the majority based its decision solely on clinical standards instead of focusing on any sort of societal moral consensus.1 2 3 Additionally,
the Chief Justice criticized the majority opinion's ambiguity in addressing
the need to adhere to clinical standards. 124 He pointed out that the majority
opinion provided no guidance when it declared that states have "'some
flexibility' but cannot 'disregard' medical standards." 2 5 Lastly, Chief Justice Roberts noted that Moore presented no evidence of a national legislative consensus and that, more importantly, the majority deviated from its
Eighth Amendment precedent when it failed to address any sort of prevalent legislative trend.1 26
III. ANALYSIS

Moore aptly illustrates the difficulties that states encounter when creating and implementing a standard for intellectual disability in capital
cases. While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Moore, it
failed to provide states with adequate guidance to enforce its ruling in Atkins. Because of the Court's ambiguity regarding state reliance on medical
standards, Moore will likely lead to additional confusion about the appropriate definition of intellectual disability for the purposes of capital punishment. First, this Case Comment argues that states risk violating the
Eighth Amendment through the doctrine of incorporation and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment if they continue to employ differing standards for determining intellectual disability. Next, it asserts that

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id
Id at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

123.

Id.

124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id. (quoting id at 1049, 1052 (majority opinion)).
See id. at 1061.

1053-54.
1054.
1055.
1055-56.
1058.
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while the Court appropriately found a national consensus in Atkins, it
should stop assessing states' procedural processes through such a lens. Finally, it advocates for a national standard to assess intellectual disability
partially based on widely accepted clinical definitions to avoid these constitutional concerns.
A. ConstitutionalConsiderationsfor a Uniform Standardof Intellectual
Disability in Capital Cases
The risk that states will unconstitutionally execute intellectually disabled defendants continues with the Court's decision in Moore. The most
apparent risk is that states will violate the Eighth Amendment by utilizing
varying standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases. Indeed, when the Court declares a punishment "cruel and unusual," a state
violates the Eighth Amendment if it practices such punishment.1 27 Consequently, beginning when the Court deemed the practice of executing intellectually disabled offenders to be "cruel and unusual" in Atkins, any state
that executes an individual who falls within this classification fails to adhere to the Eighth Amendment.1 28 This is not the only constitutional consideration that arises from varying standards of intellectual disability in
capital cases. The Court's failure to provide a uniform standard also increases the risk of states violating the Eighth Amendment through undermining the doctrine of selective incorporation and possibly equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. As demonstrated below, the Court
must provide a standard that, at the very least, serves as a floor to ensure
state adherence to Atkins.
1. Incorporation Considerations
Through the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 29 the Supreme Court began to selectively incorporate the fundamental guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the states in the 1960s. 13 0 Although the

127.

See Marceau, supra note 14.

128.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
129.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation:Revisited, 71 GEo. L.J. 253, 290-91 (1982)
(providing a detailed history of the selective incorporation doctrine).
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incorporation doctrine remains a hotly contested concept among scholars,131 the doctrine unequivocally provides that the "incorporate[d]" guarantees apply equally to both the states and the federal government.1 32 Indeed, once the Court determines that a right is incorporated, a state may
not provide "only a 'watered-down,
subjective version of the individual
1 33
guarantees of the Bill of Rights."'
While not all of the guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights have
been applied to the states, the Court has incorporated many of the criminal
justice provisions.' 34 For instance, in Gideon v. Wainwright,135 the Court
held that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in criminal prosecutions
applied to the states through Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 36
When the Court decided Gideon, thirty-seven states already had provisions
guaranteeing this right.1 37 Although eight of the thirteen states without the
statutory right to assistance of counsel had developed the right "without
[the] benefit of any statute or rule of [the] court," 38 the Court's ruling in
Gideon made it unconstitutional for these states not to provide counsel to
indigent criminal offenders facing felony charges.139 And while many

131.

See, e.g., Kenneth Katkin, "Incorporation"of the CriminalProcedureAmendments: The

View from the States, 84 NEB. L. REV. 397, 398 (2005); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise:
Reassessing the Early Understandingin Court and Congress on Incorporationofthe Bill ofRights in

the FourteenthAmendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1067-78 (2000).
132.

Israel, supra note 130, at 291; Marceau, supra note 14, at 1242.

133.

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel. Easton v. Price, 364 U.S.

263, 275 (1960) (per curiam)) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination
applies to the states); Israel, supra note 130, at 295.

134.

Israel, supra note 130, at 253, 253 n.2 (providing a list of the thirteen Bill of Rights guar-

antees that pertain to the "criminal justice process," which include: (1) search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment; (2) grand jury indictment under the Fifth Amendment; (3) double jeopardy under
the Fifth Amendment; (4) Fifth Amendment right to due process; (5) self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment; (6) Sixth Amendment right to a public and speedy trial; (7) Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury; (8) notice under the Sixth Amendment; (9) right to confront opposing witnesses
under the Sixth Amendment; (10) right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment; (11)
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process; (12) Eighth Amendment proscription against excessive fines; and (13) Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment).

135.
136.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 342, 344.

137.
Katkin, supra note 131, at 462 (citing Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" ofan Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,

17(1962)).
138.
Id.at464.
139.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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scholars have criticized Gideon for a myriad of reasons,1 4 0 the Court's decision provided a bright-line rule: states must provide counsel to those indigent defendants facing felony charges. 141
Despite the fact that the Court first began interpreting the Eighth
Amendment during the nineteenth century,142 it did not incorporate the
Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
until 1962 with its decision in Robinson.14 3 After the Court's decision in
Robinson, its categorical bans against capital punishment in certain situations or with regard to particular offenders were to apply with equal force
to both states and the federal government.1 44 For instance, in Roper v. Simmons,1 45 the Court held that both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
"forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the
age of 18 when their crimes were committed."l 46 Through the doctrine of
incorporation, this categorical ban against executing juvenile offenders
equally extends to the federal government and those states that continue to
utilize capital punishment. 147 Thus, the Court must provide a uniform definition of intellectual disability as it did with juvenile offenders in Roper
to ensure the categorical ban announced in Atkins does not lend itself to
violations of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Equal Protection Considerations
Not only do differing standards for determining intellectual disability
risk undermining selective incorporation but they also perhaps violate the
equal protection clause. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o

140.

See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A ProblemofPolitical Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694,

2698 (2013) (criticizing the Court for "remain[ing] crucially silent on the quality and scope of services
that constitutionally sufficient counsel must provide or on the appropriate mechanisms for the funding,
appointment, training, or supervision of such counsel"); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's
Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1462 (2003) (noting that the Court's decision in Gideon "left
open the critical question of how states might develop a coherent system of representation for indigent
individuals charged with crimes").

141.

Timothy P. O'Neill, "Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again ": The Failure of Illinois Ap-

pellate Courts to Protect Their Criminal Decisions from United States Supreme Court Review, 36

Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 893, 894 n.13 (2005).
142.

Erin E. Braatz, The Eighth Amendment's Milieu: Penal Reform in the Late Eighteenth Cen-

tury, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 405, 414-16 (2016).
143.
Robinson v. Wainwright, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Marceau, supranote 14, at 1287..
144.
See Marceau, supranote 14, at 1287 (explaining that the Court's decision in Robinson incorporated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).

145.
146.

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 578.

See id at 560 (stating that the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
147.
Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the Court's ruling applies to both the federal government and
the states); see also Catherine B. Pober, The Eighth Amendment's ProscriptionAgainst Cruel and
Unusual PunishmentsRequires a CategoricalRejection of the Death Penalty as Imposed on Juvenile

Offenders Under the Age of Eighteen: Roper v. Simmons, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 121, 124 n.31 (2005).
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State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 48 Each state's standards for determining intellectual disability for the purpose of capital punishment also should be assessed
through an equal protection lens to ensure adherence to Atkins.
The crux of an equal protection analysis lies in the level of scrutiny
applied by the Court based on the class of individuals a law purportedly
discriminates against.149 If an equal protection claim involves a "suspect
class," meaning a law that discriminates on the basis of national origin or
race,15 0 the Court applies a "strict scrutiny" standard of review where the
government must show its classification is "narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest."' 5 ' However, short of a government action involving a suspect classification, the Court applies more lenient
standards of review. 152
If a governmental action purportedly discriminates against a "quasisuspect" classification, the Court uses heightened scrutiny, a standard
which is more deferential to the government's interest than strict scrutiny. 5 3 The Court utilizes several factors to determine if a classification is
quasi-suspect and thus entitled to some form of heightened scrutiny, which
include: a history of pervasive discrimination against the group, the
group's immutable characteristics, the group's "ability to contribute to society," the classification reflecting "deep-seated prejudice," and the
group's general political powerlessness.1 54 However, if a court determines
the group is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, it applies the extremely
deferential "rational-basis review" where the law will be upheld if the government can show a "rational relationship" to a "legitimate government
purpose." 55
For an Atkins claim, the analysis hinges on the rights of intellectually
disabled offenders to be free from state infliction of capital punishment.

§ 1.

148.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

149.

David J. Shannon, "No Pass, No Play ": Equal ProtectionAnalysis Under the Federaland

State Constitutions,63 IND. L.J. 161, 163 (1987).
150.
Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of RationalBasis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should
Acknowledge Its Application ofHeightenedScrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Sexual Orientation,

73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2772 (2005).
151.
See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997); see also Smith, supra note 150; Stacey
L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn't Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal Protection Analysis for
Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 500 (2015).

152.
153.
154.

Smith, supra note 150, at 2772-73.
1d. at 2773.
Sobel, supra note 151, at 501 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)

(acknowledging a pervasive history of sex discrimination)); see Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638
(1986) (noting close relatives do not share immutable characteristics "that define them as a discrete

group"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 445 (1985) (discussing the
ability of those with intellectual disabilities to contribute to society and their political power); Plyler

v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (discussing the deep-seated prejudice against illegal aliens).
155.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
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However, the Court has refused to recognize those with intellectual disabilities as a suspect, or even quasi-suspect, class.' 56 Despite finding that
intellectual disability is an immutable characteristic and that those individuals with intellectual disability have a history of experiencing discrimination, in City of Cleburne v. CleburneLiving Center,157 the Court found that
intellectually disabled individuals are not a suspect class because they are
not politically powerless.' 5 8 Consequently, the Court only afforded the
class rational basis review to assess the zoning ordinance at issue in
Cleburne.'59 However, unlike most of the laws that have overcome rational
basis review in an equal protection analysis, the Court held that the city's
interests for the zoning ordinance were not legitimate.160 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court reasoned that the government's stated interest of
preventing the negative attitudes of neighbors was not a legitimate reason
for denying the permit and that the government did not properly justify its
position that the living center would be overcrowded.161 Although the
Court purported to use rational basis, many scholars have argued that the
outcome of Cleburne denoted a slightly higher standard than traditional
rational basis review.' 62 What is more, the dissent noted that the "ordi63
nance surely would be valid under the traditional rational-basis test."'1
Differing state standards of assessing intellectual disability for capital
punishment alone will not trigger an equal protection violation. However,
the clinical childhood-onset requirement that many states employ which
requires individuals to show their below average IQ and adaptive deficits
were present before the age of eighteen could be considered unconstitutional.1 64 As Professor Steven Mulroy has explained, the childhood-onset

156.

Clebuene, 473 U.S. at 442; see Heller, 509 U.S. at 321; see also Laura L. Rovner, Disability,

Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1071 (2004) (providing an in-depth analysis of
Cleburne).

157.

473 U.S. 432.

Id. at 443-45 (finding that the state and federal legislative responses to protecting intellec158.
tually disabled individuals illustrate that the class is not politically powerless); see Steven J. Mulroy,
Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and Constitutional Problems with the "Childhood Onset" Re-

quirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591, 631 (2013).
159.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
160.
Id. at 448; see Mulroy, supra note 158, at 631-32 (explaining the Court's rejection of the
city's various justifications for the ordinance).
Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: IntermediateScrutiny by Any Other Name,
161.

62 IND. L.J. 779, 794 (1987).
162.
See, e.g., Mulroy, supra note 158, at 632; Pettinga, supra note 161 (observing that the
Court's "ensuing review [in Cleburne] was more exacting than the traditional rational basis test").
163.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Pettinga,
supra note 161.

164.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT.

§ 921.137(1)

(2017); TENN. CODE ANN.

§

39-13-203(a)(3) (2017);
&

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (2017); see also AM. ASS'N OF INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 1 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY]; AM.
PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33 (5th ed.

2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
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prong of an intellectual disability determination could plausibly fail a traditional rational basis analysis.1 6 5 He argues that this prong likely fails because a state's justification for using the age requirement to assess intellectual disability in capital cases does not rationally relate to any sort of
penological purpose.1 66 Indeed, individuals who experience some form of
trauma after their eighteenth birthday that results in intellectual and adaptive deficits similar to those of someone who has been medically diagnosed as intellectually disabled will still be eligible for the death penalty
in a state that requires a showing of childhood onset.' 67 Consequently,
states that employ the clinical childhood-onset requirement arguably risk
violating the equal protection clause under a traditional rational basis analysis because those individuals who are similarly situated will be treated
differently merely because the trauma occurred after a certain age. 168 The
Court should provide states with a uniform standard for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases because the variations in state procedures
for an Atkins claim may violate the equal protection clause if some states
continue to utilize a childhood-onset requirement.
B. The Difficulty of Finding a National Consensus in the Proceduresfor
DeterminingIntellectualDisability
The proscription against executing intellectually disabled offenders
was realized through a national consensus that formed against the practice.1 69 If the Court continues to consider the national moral consensus
when providing procedural guidelines, it risks nullifying the original ban
it announced in Atkins. Thus, the Court should instead provide the states
with a standard for determining intellectual disability in capital cases to
serve, at the very least, as a floor to avoid the potential constitutional problems discussed above.
1. The Substantive Ban Against Executing Intellectually Disabled
Offenders
In Atkins, the Court conducted an Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis to assess whether a national consensus had formed regarding the
lesser moral culpability of intellectually disabled offenders.17 0 Ultimately,

165.

Mulroy, supra note 158, at 644-45.

166.
Id. at 651. The use of the age of onset requirement for intellectual disability in capital cases
is analogous to the policy of executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old adolescents, but not fifteenyear-old adolescents, because of the penological interests involved. See Michael J. Spillane, The Execution of Juvenile Offenders: Constitutionaland InternationalLaw Objections, 60 UMKC L. REV.

113, 124-25 (1991) (explaining that Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Stanford v. Kentucky,
noted that "if the fact that death penalty for juvenile offenders truly serves no legitimate penological
function is proven scientifically, then the juvenile death penalty should be invalidated under the Equal
Protection Clause as irrational").
167.
Mulroy, supra note 158, at 595.

168.
169.
170.

Id. at 628-29.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
Id.
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it determined that "our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal" based on the trend in
state legislation banning the practice of executing intellectually disabled
offenders.1 7 1 Indeed, the Court noted that in the fourteen years between
Penry and Atkins, eighteen states and the federal government enacted statutes banning the practice.1 72 While the number of states with such a ban
bolstered the notion of a national consensus, the Court recognized that "[i]t
is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the con,,173
sistency of the direction of change.
What is more, no states passed legislation reinstating the practice of executing intellectually disabled offenders during that period. 174
While the Court found that a national consensus had formed against
the practice, it noted that the states still disagreed about what occurs when
"determining which offenders are in fact retarded."'7 5 Despite acknowledging the likelihood of conflicting interpretations, the Court nevertheless
provided states with the autonomy to develop their own standards for determining intellectual disability in capital cases. 17 6 The only guidance it
provided was that the standards states employ must protect individuals
whose intellectual disability places them within the group of those offenders that society has "deemed to have lesser culpability and a greater risk
of wrongful [capital] conviction and/or execution." 77 Allowing this
amount of discretion will likely lead to variations in state procedures and
thus lend itself to the very thing that the Court prohibited in Atkins: the
execution of intellectually disabled defendants.
2. The Court Should Cease Searching for a National Consensus to
Determine the Adequacy of State Procedures
Although the Court determined that a national consensus had formed
against the practice of executing intellectually disabled individuals, it continues to search for national consensus in the state procedures used to assess an Atkins claim.' 78 In the first case that it assessed after Atkins, the
Court invalidated Florida's bright-line IQ cutoff of 70 after finding that
many states do not employ such a standard.' 79 In reaching its determination, the Court stated that "[a] significant majority of States implement the
protections of Atkins by taking the SEM into account."' 80 The Court then

171.

Id. at 314-16; see Crowell, supranote 58, at 745.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 317.
Id.

177.

Barger, supra note 23, at 226.

178.
1996-97
179.
180.

See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052-53 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986,
(2014).
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
Id. at 1996.
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went on to detail the practices of each state, concluding that "[t]he rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the 'consistency in the trend' toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence
of [a] consensus." 18
In Moore, the Court utilized the national consensus framework when
determining whether Texas's use of the Briseno factors to assess intellectual disability in capital cases violated Atkins.' 8 2 While the Court rejected
the CCA's dismissal of an offender's various IQ scores and its assessment
of adaptive functioning, it purported to do so because the procedures did
not adhere to generally accepted clinical standards, not under the pretext
of a lack of national consensus.183 However, the Court's decision arguably
implicitly relied on its interpretation of national consensus in its evaluation
of the CCA's IQ determination because it cited to Hall when it rejected
the CCA's conclusion that Moore's IQ scores showed he was not intellectually disabled.1 84 While Justice Ginsburg made no mention of consensus
in this portion of the opinion, her reliance on Hall seemingly incorporates
a search for a national consensus because the Court's holding in Hall was
based on the finding of such a consensus.'ss
The Court may have shied away from outwardly relying on the national consensus analysis in its evaluation of the CCA's IQ and adaptive
function standards, but it did explicitly employ the analysis when it concluded that the Briseno factors violate the Eighth Amendment.' 8 6 It reasoned that Texas's use of the Briseno factors "[is] an outlier, in comparison . . . to other States' handling of intellectual-disability."' The Court
found that "[n]o state legislature has approved the use of the Briseno factors or anything similar."' 88 But the Court did not need to employ such an
analysis in determining whether the Briseno factors risked executing those
offenders whose intellectual disability renders them categorically less culpable than the average criminal. Instead, Justice Ginsburg should have utilized the same analysis as with her evaluation of the CCA's IQ determination and its assessment of adaptive functioning.
Indeed, such an analysis would have allowed the Court to quickly
dismiss the Briseno factors due to their lack of clinical basis. The Court
recognized that the Briseno factors are not rooted in "any authority, medical or judicial."' 89 The lack of clinical reliability in these factors is bol-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 1998 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005)).
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052.
Id. at 1049-50.
Id at 1049.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052-53.
Id. at 1052.
Id
Id at 1046.
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stered by the fact that the factors are based on a work of fiction-specifically the character Lennie in John Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men-a point
that the opinion wholly fails to recognize. 190 What is more, the Briseno
court provided no reason as to why Lennie's adaptive functioning was an
appropriate measure for intellectual disability, besides stating that Lennie
has a "lack of reasoning ability and adaptive skills."l 9' Further, it is unlikely that Lennie himself would have been spared from execution if a
court weighed his crime against the Briseno factors.' 92
Not only are the Briseno factors based on a piece of fiction that is
nearly a century old but they also readily lend themselves to the perpetuation of lay stereotypes concerning intellectual disability, such as the common misconception that all intellectually disabled people are essentially
identical to one another.' 9 3 While the Court ignored the roots of the
Briseno factors, it did recognize that the factors perpetuate the very stereotypes that the medical community seeks to curtail. 194 Justice Ginsburg
observed: "Those stereotypes, much more than medical and clinical appraisals, should spark skepticism [in the use of the factors]."l95 Instead of
hinging its rejection of the factors on a lack of national consensus toward
their use, the Court should have based its decision on the incredulity of
determining whether an offender lives or dies based on nothing more than
mere stereotypes and fiction.
The procedures employed by the CCA demonstrate that no true national consensus exists regarding which intellectually disabled offenders
are "categorically less culpable than the average criminal." 96 As of 2016,
the United States estimated its population to be around 300 million people.' 9 7 Nineteen states have abolished the death penalty, and four additional states have fully suspended its use through gubernatorial moratoria.198 Thus, these states, which comprise more than thirty seven percent

190.
See Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046; see also Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004), abrogatedby Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039.
See Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 6; Hannah Brewer, The Briseno Factors:How Literary Guid191.
ance Outsteps the Bounds ofAtkins in the Post-HallLandscape, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 240, 251 (2017).

192.

Julia

Barton,

Judging

Steinbeck's

Lennie,

LIFE

L.

(Sept.

3,

2013),

http://www.lifeofthelaw.org/2013/09/judging-steinbeck-lennie (noting that Professor John Blume of
Cornell Law opines that Lennie himself would have been executed under the Briseno factors, stating,
"I mean, after he accidentally strangles the young woman, he tries to cover it up. That's one of the
factors the Briseno opinion cites as evidence that somebody doesn't have mental retardation. They
would look into the fact, 'well, he worked. He worked as a farm hand. He was gainfully employed."').
193.
Brief of Amici Curiae, The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD), and The Arc of the United States as Amici Curiae, in Support of Petitioner at 9,

Moore, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15-797), 2016 WL 4151447, at *9.
194.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051-52.
195.
Id. at 1052.
196.
197.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
US. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock

(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
Wong, supra note 69, at 438; see States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH
198.
PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Mar.
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of the entire U.S. population,199 do not believe that the death penalty is an
acceptable form of punishment, regardless of the crime committed. While
Moore's intellectual disability would have been relevant for sentencing
purposes in twenty-seven states, it would have been a null issue had he
murdered McCarble in at least twenty-three different states. 200 Consequently, a mere change in venue could completely reshape the terms of
Moore's punishment despite the details of Moore's crime and his intellectual ability remaining the same. This variation in what each state considers
an "appropriate sentence" indicates the lack of national consensus on the
morality of capital punishment.20 1
In addition to the differences between the states that continue to employ capital punishment and those that don't, significant variation remains
in intellectual disability standards in those states that still use the death
penalty.2 02 In fact, the parameters for assessing intellectual disability in
capital cases differ vastly among those twenty-seven states that continue
to utilize capital punishment, creating a problematic tension.between selective incorporation and states' rights.203 Many of these states have
adopted the same general three-part framework for determining intellectual disability recommended in the American Association on Intellectual
and Developmental Disability (AAIDD) and the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(APA). 204 This definition includes three equally weighted components:
subaverage intellectual functioning, limitations in adaptive functioning,
and an "onset of [these] deficits" during adolescence. 205
What is even more concerning is the large variation in how states
interpret and assess each of these elements. 206 For instance, Texas uses the
25, 2018) (stating as of November 9, 2016, the states without the death penalty include: Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Those with gubernatorial moratoria include: Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington).
199.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2017 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/nation-total.html (based on 2016 estimates of
population of the following states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
200.
Moore's intellectual disability would not have been a factor for sentencing in those states
that do not employ the death penalty. See States With and Without the DeathPenalty, supra note 198.

201.
202.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305.
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996-98 (2014).

203.

See Barger, supra note 23, at 227-29.

204.
205.

Id. at 226.
Saviello, supra note 50, at 181; see Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (2017) (quoting

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995) (explaining that subaverage intellectual functioning is generally "indicated
by an IQ score 'approximately two standard deviations below the mean'-i.e., a score of roughly 70");

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (defining adaptive deficits as "the inability to learn basic skills and adjust
behavior to changing circumstances"); AAIDD, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY, supra note 164; DSM-5,
supra note 164.

206.

Barger, supra note 23, at 227-29.
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clinical definition of intellectual disability found in the 1992 edition of the
AAMR. 2 07 This version is similar to the AAIDD's three-part definition;
however, individuals must also provide evidence that their adaptive deficits are related to subaverage intellectual functioning. 208 While the latest
version of the APA definition also has a relatedness component, the current version of the AAIDD abandoned this requirement. 209
Furthermore, Texas used the Briseno evidentiary factors to determine
the relatedness of an offender's intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning, with a particular focus on the offender's adaptive strengths.210
These factors, which were not attributed to clinical authority, required a
jury to answer seven questions based upon lay perceptions of intellectual
disability. 2 1 1 For example, juries in Texas were asked to consider whether
those who knew the defendant during adolescence thought the defendant
was "mentally retarded." 2 12 However, the Court noted in Moore that no
other state legislatures have adopted the Briseno factors, or anything remotely similar, since its decision in Atkins.213 Had Moore murdered
McCarble in any other state, the jury would not have had to consider if the
people that knew Moore personally believed he was intellectually disabled. Indeed, other states that continue to condone capital punishment do
not seem to believe that purely subjective factors help a jury to determine
the overall culpability of an intellectually disabled defendant.2 14
Additionally, a variation exists in the way states utilize an offender's
215
IQ scores to determine intellectual disability in capital cases.21 Before the
Hall Court decreed that states must account for the SEM of an individual's
IQ, nine states utilized standards that "could be interpreted to provide a
216
Of those nine states,
bright-line cutoff' for intellectual functioning.
Kentucky, Florida, and Virginia adopted legislation that explicitly mandated a "fixed score cutoff." 217 While the Court held that fixed score cut-

207.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1046.
208.
Id.
209.
Id. at 1055 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
210.
Id. at 1052 n.9 (majority opinion).
211.
Id. at 1051-53; Crowell, supranote 58, at 750.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051-53 (quoting Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App.
212.
2004)); Crowell, supranote 58, at 750.
213.
Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1052.
214.
Id. (noting that no other state employs standards even remotely similar to the subjective
Briseno factors).

215.

Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996-97 (2014).

216.
Id. (explaining that Arizona, Kansas, Washington, North Carolina, and Delaware have statutes in which courts may interpret the standards to require an IQ below a fixed point before assessing
the defendant's adaptive deficits).

217.

Id. at 1996; see FLA. STAT.

§ 921.137(1)

(2017) (defining "significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning" as "performance [on an IQ test] that is two or more standard deviations from
the mean score on a standardized intelligence test"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.130(2) (West 2017)
(defining "[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning" as "an intelligence quotient

(I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below"); VA. CODE ANN.
identical definition to Florida's statutory definition).

§

19.2-264.3:1.1(A) (2017) (providing a nearly
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offs are unconstitutional pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, these particular state legislatures had previously determined that individuals with an
IQ above a certain point were just as categorically culpable as the average
criminal. 2 18 These differences in standards illustrate that states utilizing
capital punishment have not reached a consensus on which offenders fall
into this particular categorical ban.
Even more telling is that some states cannot reach a legislative consensus on an appropriate standard for intellectual disability. In 1989, the
Texas legislature first considered banning the execution of such individuals. 219 While the legislature proposed multiple iterations of the ban between 1989 and 2000, none of these proposals ever came to fruition.220
After twelve years, both houses of the Texas legislature finally approved
procedures to determine if an individual qualifies as intellectually disabled, but the Governor subsequently vetoed the bill. 2 2 ' Even after the
Court's decision in Atkins, Texas has been unable to reach a legislative
consensus, instead relying on the courts to provide an appropriate interim
standard.222 Indeed, the Texas legislature has attempted to promulgate
fourteen separate bills since the Court first decided Atkins.22 3 While the
Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence dictates that the most
appropriate "objective evidence of contemporary values" is found in state
224
Texas cannot seem to reach a consensus regarding the moral
legislators,
compass of its own citizenry.
These differences among various states and even the lawmakers in a
single state illustrate that a national consensus on the procedures for implementing Atkins is more of a myth than a reality. Such lack of uniformity
reveals that Moore's crime would not have been treated equally in all
states for the purposes of death penalty eligibility. 22 5 The Court is grasping
to create a uniform picture of contemporary values that will never truly

218.
As the statutes in Kentucky, Florida, and Virginia illustrate, these particular states determined that an offender with an IQ above 70 remain eligible for the death penalty. See Noah Cyr Engelhart, Matching the Trajectory of the Supreme Court on Intellectual DisabilityDefense: A Recommen-

dationfor the States, 79 ALB. L. REV. 567, 576 (2015).
219.
Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 23-24 (detailing Texas's extensive legislative history in considering the implementation of such a ban).

220.

Id.; see Sarah Gail Tuthill, The Texas-Size Struggle to Implement Atkins v. Virginia, 14

TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 145, 148 (2007).
221.
Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 32; Crowell, supra note 58, at 745.
222.
Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 32-35 (detailing the intellectual disability standards that the
Texas legislature proposed at least four times since Atkins, all of which failed to pass both legislative
houses); Crowell, supra note 58, at 745-46.

223.
224.

Tuthill, supra note 220.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (explaining the methods of determining if a

national consensus has formed for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment).
225.
Although criminal sentencing generally varies greatly from state to state, a variation in
death penalty eligibility in the context of intellectually disabled offenders is problematic. This is primarily because when the Court held that executing intellectually disabled offenders violates the Constitution, the doctrine of selective incorporation mandates that those guarantees apply equally to both
the states and the federal government. See supra Section III.A. I.
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exist. Instead of attempting to cobble together a common standard of societal decency, the Court must use its own judgment to determine the appropriate procedures for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases or
it risks violating the Eighth Amendment by undermining the doctrine of
incorporation, and perhaps even violating equal protection.
C. Creatinga Uniform Standard
Both Moore and Hall demonstrate the discrepancies in what states
consider to be the "best" methods to assess intellectual disability in capital
cases. The differences in state definitions, compounded by the Court's
vagueness when addressing such standards, have left the states with little
guidance in creating an appropriate test to satisfy the constitutional ban
against executing intellectually disabled criminals. Over the past fifteen
years, the Court has consistently held that states may create their own definitions of intellectual disability.226 However, the Court continuously requires states to be informed by widely accepted medical standards when
crafting these definitions.227 Additionally, the Court attempted to narrow
the scope of state discretion when it held that states must consider the SEM
of an offender's IQ score.228 Nevertheless, the Court's decision in Moore
failed to provide states with additional guidance. Justice Ginsburg remained vague in the majority opinion, claiming that clinical guidelines
need not fully dictate state standards, all the while focusing heavily on
Texas's deviation from medical consensus.22 9
1. The Parallels to Roper v. Simmons
In Roper, the Court held that executing those offenders who committed a capital crime before the age of eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment.230 The decision, which was announced only three years after Atkins,
drew several parallels between defendants under the age of eighteen and
intellectually disabled offenders.231 As in Atkins, the Roper Court concluded that a national consensus had formed against the practice of executing juveniles, showing that individuals under the age of eighteen are
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal."2 32 However, distinct from the ban announced in Atkins, the Roper Court provided the states
with a clear rule: no state nor the federal government may execute an offender under the age of eighteen.233
While one can categorize the Court's holding in Roper as a brightline rule, it can likewise be described as providing the states with a floor.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 317.
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
Id. at 1995.
See Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id. at 570-72.
Id. at 567 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).

233.

Id. at 574.
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In fact, the Court included several appendixes detailing states' definition
of adulthood for various activities.234 Most notable are some of the age-ofadulthood laws in Mississippi, which continues to employ the death penalty, where an individual must be twenty-one to qualify for jury service235
but can marry before the age of eighteen. 236 However, Mississippi law continues to treat age as merely a mitigating factor that a jury may consider
when determining capital sentencing (although it cannot execute anyone
under the age of eighteen after the Court's decision in Roper).237 Indeed,
in many states juveniles, who likely do not enjoy the full rights of adulthood in other respects, may be charged as an adult far before their eight238
eenth birthday. Consequently, one could plausibly argue that the Court's
holding in Roper acts more as a floor than as a bright-line rule, permitting
states to increase the age for death penalty eligibility or even abolish the
practice altogether. This is to say that the similarities in the Court's assessment of the culpability ofjuveniles and of intellectually disabled offenders
merely bolster the call for the Court to provide states with a uniform definition of intellectual disability. This would merely require states to abide
by the Court's standard for determining death penalty eligibility for intellectually disabled defenders while still leaving them free to craft a more
protective standard for defendants or to employ more lenient standards in
other respects, such as length of sentencing.
2. Utilizing Widely Accepted Clinical Standards
To avoid Eighth Amendment and equal protection clause challenges,
the Court should provide states with a legal definition of intellectual disability in capital cases. The Court's decision in Moore indicates that states
may not consider factors that have no medical basis, like the Briseno evidentiary questions. 2 3 9 The Court's holding is appropriate because lay perceptions of intellectual disability may perpetuate the stereotypes that the
medical community seeks to combat. 24 0 In fact, lay witnesses who provide
testimony regarding a defendant's intellectual and adaptive functioning
may be presenting their own biases or an inaccurate perception of the disability. 24 1 The use of this sort of testimony will likely increase the risk of

234.
Id. at 579-87 (listing state statutes in Appendices A-D establishing the age of majority for
the death penalty, voting, jury service, and marriage).

235.

MISS. CODE ANN.

§ 13-5-1

(2018).

236.
Id. § 93-1-5 (providing that males must be at least seventeen years of age to legally marry,
whereas females must be at least fifteen years of age).

237.
238.

Id. § 99-19-101(6)(g).
See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(a) (2017) (requiring mandatory transfer for

certain crimes at the age of fifteen); MO. REV. STAT.

§ 211.071(1)

transfer at the age of twelve); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§

(2017) (allowing for discretionary

2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) (West 2017) (requiring

mandatory transfer for certain crimes at the age of sixteen).

239.
240.

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1051-52 (2017).
Id. at 1052.

241.

Tobolowsky, supra note 29, at 76.

2018]

CONTINUED QUEST FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD

807

a court inaccurately deciding whether a defendant is intellectually disa-

bled.
For example, both Utah's and Kansas's tests for adaptive functioning
should theoretically be invalidated by the Court's holding in Moore because they "have little or no relation to the clinically defined disability of
mental retardation." 242 As Chief Justice Roberts opined in Moore, the majority bases its decision from a purely clinical point of view but assures the
reader "that it is not requiring-adherence 'to everything stated in the latest
medical guide."' 24 3 The Court's continuing ambiguity regarding medical
standards leaves states with little direction when creating an appropriate
test for intellectual disability.
The variances in state standards increase the risk that the Court's
mandate will be violated. As Justice Ginsburg stated in Moore, "[s]tates
may not execute anyone in 'the entire category of [intellectually disabled]
offenders."' 2 44 So long as states continue to employ different means of determining intellectual disability, the likelihood of executing an individual
who falls within the categorical ban articulated in Atkins remains high.
Thus, the Court should provide a conclusive definition, along with an appropriate test, to assess whether an individual accused of a capital crime
qualifies as intellectually disabled.
This proposed national standard should be informed by clinical
guidelines' first two prongs of intellectual disability. However, as noted
by the majority opinion in Hall, clinical definitions may prove problematic
at times.245 These problems include the evolving nature of clinical definitions to reflect new medical breakthroughs and the potential imprecision
of scientific measurement and analysis.24 6 However, lay witnesses and perceptions are likely far more subjective than medical standards. Crafting a
standard informed by clinical definitions of intellectual disability will allow individuals with disabilities who have been convicted of capital
crimes to be assessed on a level playing field, regardless of the state where
they stand trial.
And while bias and misunderstanding may understandably color jury
perceptions, a clearly articulated standard informed by widely accepted
clinical definitions will help combat the prejudices that often permit the
execution of intellectually disabled defendants. Therefore, the Court

Barger, supra note 23, at 229 (explaining how the assessment of adaptive deficits allow
242.
states to consider both an offender's culpability and the "insufficient connection to the penological
theories of deterrence and retribution").

243.
ion)).

Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1058 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1049 (majority opin-

244.

Id. at 1051 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting Roper v. Simmons,

543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005)).
245.
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1995 (2014) (explaining that states must assess an IQ's
SEM in part because of the "inherent imprecision of the [IQ] test itself").
See Saviello, supra note 50, at 182-92 (detailing the imprecision of the tests for both intel246.

lectual disability and adaptive deficits).
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should provide a clear and concise definition to ensure that each state adheres to the categorical ban against executing intellectually disabled offenders as mandated in Atkins.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Moore served as little more than a
lackluster attempt to provide states with guidance in creating a standard
for determining intellectual disability for the purposes of capital punishment. While the Court attempted to narrow the leniency it provided to
states with its holdings in both Moore and Hall, it has likely done nothing
more than cause confusion as states attempt to create legislation that adheres to the Court's mandates. The Court's refusal to provide states with a
functional definition of intellectual disability in capital cases might seem
merely frustrating at first glance, but it is also potentially unconstitutional-arguably violating both the Eighth Amendment and the equal protection clause. What is more, as each state creates its own test for determining intellectual disability, the states increase their risk of violating the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Thus,
the Court should provide the states with a definition to avoid these pressing
constitutional concerns.
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